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How did the East Asian miracle turn into one of the worst financial crisis of this century?
This paper examines the above question using Malaysia as a case study. Many discussions of the
East Asian crisis address proximate and short-run causes of  the crisis such as the current account
deficit,  exchange  rate  misalignment,  and  large  short-run  external  debt  relative  to  foreign
exchange reserves. These indicators  of vulnerability  are themselves endogenous  outcomes of
deeper institutional features and are more a symptom than a cause of the underlying problem. We
argue that some of the long-term features of the development strategy, that helped sustain high
output growth in the first instance, also contributed to increasing vulnerability of the economy.
The banking system played a critical role in transforming and accelerating large savings into
capital accumulation. Capital accumulation was the key driver of output growth. But the banking
system was not  always  allocating capital efficiently. We find  that the  rapid growth in  bank
lending  is  associated  with  falling  total  factor  productivity  growth.  Policy  observers  have
suggested that bank lending growth of one to two times GDP growth should be  expected for
most countries during normal times [Caprio and Klingebiel (1997)]. If bank lending is too rapid,
as was the case in Malaysia,  project selection, risk management, and monitoring capability of
banks get compromised. In the face of rapid growth in lending, it is difficult for the managers of
individual banks, and the supervisors, to ensure that capital is being allocated to most productive
activities. A rapid build-up in bank credit can thus lower the quality of investment projects and
thereby reduce productivity growth [ see for example, Gavin and Hausmann (1996), Radelet and
Sachs (1998)].
This paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the key drivers  of growth-
capital, educational attainment of the workforce (a proxy for human capital), and total factor
productivity  growth.  We  use  a  growth  accounting  framework  to  consistently  decompose
Malaysia's  GDP growth into growth in physical capital stock per worker, human capital per
worker, and growth in total factor productivity (TFP)'. We find that the key driver of growth in
Malaysia has  been physical  capital  accumulation. Its  contribution  averaged  nearly  50%  per
annum  during  the  period  1971-97.  By  contrast,  the  relative  contribution  of  total  factor
productivity growth averaged only 20% during the same period.  TFP growth has fluctuated
substantially over time, and it has fallen during the latter half of the 1990s.
' There is an extensive literature on productivity growth in the context of the East Asia miracle
[see Collins and Bosworth (1996), Kim and Lau (1994), Krugman (1994), Pack (1998), Page
(1994), Rodrik (1997), Sarel (1997), World Bank (1993), Young (1994), and see the references
in these articles].
3Section III reports estimates of TFP growth regressions and results of sensitivity analysis.
Section IV takes a closer look at growth in bank lending and its sectoral distribution. Section V
concludes.
II.  SOURCES OF GROWTH
Output growth can be caused by labor, capital, and productivity growth. We can derive a
conventional growth accounting equation from the neoclassical production function'.
Yt=F(At,  Kt, Lt,)  (1)
Where A is the level of technology, and K and L are capital stock and quantity of labor
respectively.  Differentiating the above equation with respect to time and dividing throughout by
Y we obtain:
Y  (FAA)* A +(FKK  K  FLL  L  (2) (  A  )*+(  )*~+(  L)*_(2
I'  Y  A  Y'  K  Y  L
The hat over a variable represents its time derivative.  If technological change occurs in a
Hicks-neutral manner, then F(A, K, L)  = Af(K, L) and (FAA/IY)  = 1.  Assuming that labor and
capital are paid their (social) marginal products, i.e. FK=r (rental price of capital) and FL = w
(wages) and rearranging we obtain the growth equation:
A  Y  K  * L  (3) - - a *  -_  - -3
A  Y  K  L
where a  =  rK/Y and ,  = wL/Y are shares of capital and labor in total product.  Assuming
constant returns to scale, payments to factors (factor income) exhaust total product so that ,6 = 1-
a  The term T is referred to as the Solow residual or total factor productivity growth.
Ideally,  the aggregate capital input is a composite index of different varieties of capital
employed with each variety being weighted by its share in the total returns to capital.  Similarly,
the labor input is ideally a composite index of labor differentiated by age, gender, education,
sector and hours of work.  In the estimates presented below, however, capital and labor are not
differentiated in  this  manner because  detailed data  are not  available.  The  absence  of  such
"quality" adjustments generally tends to underestimate the aggregate input use.
As can be seen from equation (3) in order to estimate TFP growth we need data on capital
stocks, labor, and a.
2 The derivation here follows Barro (1998).
4Reliable measures of  x, the capital share in total income, are hard to come by.  Bosworth
and Collins (1996) after reviewing the existing literature find that a plausible range for capital
share is 0.3 to 0.4.  In their computations of TFP they use a fixed value of 0.35 for developing
countries,  including the East Asian  countries.  While this  is  valid only  for a  limited  set  of
production functions, they report that existing studies find little evidence of major changes in
factor shares over time.  Sarel (1997) who analyzed TFP growth in East Asian countries found no
major change in the value of ax for Malaysia which hovered around 0.32 over most of the 1978-
96 period. We adopt here a one-third share of capital, as some others have done (for instance
Klenow  and Rodriguez-Claire  1997).  However, we also  estimated TFP using the  end-range
values of 0.3 and 0.4 and find that it did not have any significant impact on the analysis.
A  series  of capital  stock  was  constructed using the  perpetual inventory  method,  as is
common in the literature.  The initial capital stock was obtained from Nehru and Dhareshwar
(1993)3. Investment data are taken from World Bank's  World Development Indicators cd-rom.
We were  unable  to  obtain disaggregated data on  capital  stocks in  order  to  conduct quality
adjustments.  The capital stock was computed with depreciation rates ranging from 0.05 to 0.12.
The impact on TFP estimates was however not appreciable.
We obtained data on employment of the labor force over the 1970-97 period from official
Malaysian publications and World Bank country reports.  Labor force was adjusted for what has
been found to  be it's  most important quality adjustment, namely, educational  attainment 4. A
series  on  the  educational  attainment  of the  labor force  was constructed 5 by  employing  the
methodology described in Nehru, Swanson, and Dubey (NSD, 1995).
Figure 1 plots the trend of TFP level, capital per worker, and output per worker during the
period  1974 to  1997, employing an cc value of  1/3, d = 0.075, and quality unadjusted  factor
inputs.  The level of output per worker has consistently increased during the last two and a half
decades. Most of this came through the increases in the level of capital per worker, especially in
the 1990s. The TFP level has been relatively flat and has contributed less to output relative to
capital.
Malaysia faced two major economic crisis during the last two decades. During both crises,
a downturn in the TFP growth is evident prior to the crisis. TFP growth fell in the early  1980s
prior  to  the first  crisis  in  1984-85 (Figure 2).  This  was followed by  a  sharp recovery  and
impressive  performance  during  the  period  1987-90,  as  the  Government  liberalized  the
manufacturing  sector, resulting  in  increased inflow  of  foreign direct  investments,  import  of
capital goods, and technical change.  TFP growth slowed down in the latter part of the 1990s.
3 Available on the Economic Growth Research web site of the World Bank.
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/growth_t.htm
4 One could also include human capital as a separate factor of production in order to capture the
impacts of education. Adjusting the labor input assumes that the benefits of education are
embodied in workers.
'Constructed  by Koji Miyamoto (June, 1999).
5Although the variations  in TFP growth could reflect the pro-cyclical nature  of the measured
variable, there were other iactors and policies that were also in play that might have influenced
the changes in productivity growth, as we attempt to show below.
The growth rates of physical capital per worker, human capital per  worker (proxied by
educational  attainment per  worker,  and  TFP  and their  relative  contributions  to  total  output
growth  at three-year intervals,  excluding crisis years 6,  during  the period  1971-97 period  are
shown in Figures 3 and 4. We choose the three year intervals for ease of presentation, and it does
not alter the substantive conclusions. Consistent with earlier findings, we find that growth in the
physical capital accumulation is the key contributor to output growth.  Averaged over the entire
period its contribution was 47%.  The contribution human capital averaged 33%, while that of
TFP growth averaged 20%.
Between  1987-1991,  the  five  years  following  the  last  recession,  TFP  was  the  chief
contributor to growth averaging 60 per cent.  The contribution of capital per worker in this period
was under  10 per cent.  In more recent years (1993-97), however, the contribution of TFP has
fallen to under 10 percent.  In this period capital accumulation became the main driver of growth
with an average share of nearly 60 per cent.  Thus compared with the late 1980s the character of
growth  in  recent  years  has  changed  from  being productivity  driven  to  input  driven.  The
contribution of education per worker was roughly 30 percent in both periods.
We also compare the Malaysian experience with other countries in the region.  For this
purpose the results of two studies (Sarel, 1997 and Bosworth and  Collins, 1996) that provide
comparative factor productivity estimates for East Asian countries are reported in Table 1.  Since
these studies use different methodologies, and time periods, their estimates are not comparable
and neither  are the estimates presented here comparable with these studies.  It  is the relative
ranking  of  the  countries  within  each  study  that  is  important.  In  Sarel's  study  Malaysia's
performance is better  than Indonesia and  Philippines, comparable with  Thailand, and  a  little
lower than Singapore.  In Bosworth and Collins'  work, while Malaysia still does better than
Philippines and Indonesia, its performance falls short of the other countries.
Role of Labor Productivity:  Declining TFP growth can be associated with  lower TFP
within sectors  and/or a  slower process  of reallocating resources from  less  to  more  efficient
sectors in the economy.  Because data on capital stock and investment by sector are not available,
TFP  growth  within  each  sector  cannot  be  measured.  Labor  productivity  unadjusted  for
educational attainment (Yi/Lj) by sector i, can, however, be computed from available data.  This
information can be  utilized to decompose economywide labor productivity change into labor
productivity change in each sector and the productivity gains achieved through the reallocation
of labor to more productive sectors.
L  = y=  EsitYi,  (5)
6 Years in which output per worker was negative, namely, 1975, 1985, and 1986.
6where  s;, = Li  is the ratio of labor employed in  sector i to total labor employed in the
economy.  Taking the differential of (5) we obtain:
dy, =s,,dyi,  +  yi,dsi,  (6)
i  i
Figure  5 shows the relative contributions of sectoral labor productivity growth and labor
reallocation between sectors to economy-wide labor productivity growth.  It can be  seen that
labor productivity growth within sectors has been the dominant contributor.  The impact of labor
reallocation which was negative till  1987-88 has been positive since then.  Given that Malaysia
has accumulated capital quite rapidly relative to labor, the increase in sectoral labor productivity
and its large contribution should not be surprising.
IV. EXPLANING  TFP GROWTH
In theory, a large number of policies and factors can contribute to output, capital and TFP
growth.  There  is  an  extensive  cross-country  empirical  literature  that  has  identified
macroeconomic, trade and  financial sector policies  as being significant factors in  explaining
output growth [Fischer (1993), King and Levine (1993), Summers and De Long (1993)].  Given
the cross-country nature of these studies over relatively long time intervals they tend to capture
long-run relationships between the chosen variables.  In contrast with the earlier literature we
employ  time-series data  for  an  individual  country rather  than cross-country  data.  In  what
follows, we would not interpret our results as capturing long-run relationships, rather what we
capture are shorter run dynamics in the specific Malaysian setting. We discuss below some of the
key policies that influenced TFP growth, at least in the short-run.  The longer run relationship
between these variables may or may not be similar.
Three structural features of Malaysia stand out. First, its openness. The ratio of exports
and imports to  GDP  for Malaysia at  190% in  1997, is high  compared to  Korea  (77%) and
Thailand (93%), Mexico (33%)  and Chile (49%).  Second, capital inflows.  FDI  inflows  into
Malaysia averaged nearly 5% of GDP during 1994-97, while it was less than 2% for Korea and
Thailand.  Third, Malaysia's  financial  sector loan  leverage and  loan  growth  is  amongst  the
highest in the world. Financial sector loan leverage, defined as the ratio of banking sector loans
to the private sector to nominal GDP was nearly 162% at end-1997. This is high in comparison
to financial sector loan leverage in Korea (74%), Thailand (145%), Mexico (25%), Chile (60%)
and UK (125%).  Growth in this ratio averaged 20% during 1992-96. This is comparable to the
loan growth in other East Asian countries such as Korea (17%), Thailand (23%), and the Latin
American countries such as Chile (23%) during the same period. Mexico's  loan growth is low at
8%  because  of  the  crisis  in  1994-95. How  did  the  banking  sector and  trade  policies,  and
institutions influence Malaysia's  growth process? What were the channels through which these
7policies impacted the growth process? Was it largely through capital accumulation or through
productivity growth?
Boom in Bank lending: Figure 6 shows the positive association between capital stock
growth and growth in the loan/GDP ratio.  Figure 7 shows that the flow of real bank loans is
positively associated with the change in physical capital stock (real investment) over the period
1971-97. These findings are not surprising.  Malaysia has had a well developed banking sector
and the availability of credit has made rapid rates of investment possible.  However, as shown in
Figure 8, rapid growth in bank lending relative to GDP appears to be negatively correlated with
TFP  growth rate. During  the period  1971-97, lending by the  commercial banks  and  finance
companies  grew at nearly  21% per  annum over. Nominal  GDP  growth, on  the  other hand,
averaged 12.5% per annum during this period. Growth in bank lending in excess of GDP growth
averaged nearly 8% per annum.
Several  factors  help  explain the  boom  in  bank  lending.  Guarantee  provided  by  the
Government is one such factor.  An example of this is Malaysia's  privatization program of its
infrastructure projects in the 1990s. The guarantees by the government to these projects and the
implicit assumption by the banking sector that the government will not let these projects fail, in
part, contributed to the growth in bank lending. The Government wanted to maximize the growth
objective,  and  rapid  growth  in  bank  lending  helped  sustain  high  growth  rates  in  capital
accumulation.
Excessive growth in bank lending also arose because of the relatively underdeveloped
nature of capital markets in Malaysia. During the period 1995-97, the banking sector accounted
for  58% of  net funds raised,  compared to  15% from the  equity market  and  11% from  the
domestic  debt  market.  This  over-dependence  on  the  banking  contributed  to  inefficient
intermediation of capital (e.g., poor risk management, loan maturity mismatches). The high risk
nature of banking (versus fund management, for example) arises from its high gearing and from
its massive asset liability mismatches and in particular from the tendency of the banking industry
to borrow short and lend long. The implicit government guarantee of deposits may have led to a
high gearing of the banking industry to more risky lending and to over investment and hence to
boom and bust cycles of the property and share markets.
Finally, some of the institutional and regulatory characteristics of the Malaysian banking
sector also help explain the rapid growth in bank lending. For example, in  1994, the Central
Bank classified banks into two tiers, Tier One and Tier Two, and doubled the minimum paid-up
capital requirements for Tier  1 banks, and allowed them to  offer a  wider range  of financial
products. The large minimum paid-up capital requirements led to shareholders of several banking
institutions to borrow short-term to enhance their capital base. Instead, capitalization should have
taken place  through non-debt sources such as internal funds or alternatively, long-term bonds
rather than borrowings. Banking institutions which borrowed heavily to fund their capitalization
plans  had  to  lend  excessively  in  order  to  generate  sufficient  returns  to  service  their  debt
obligations. This may have contributed towards their deteriorating portfolio quality.
8Growth in Foreign Direct Investments and imported capital goods: Figure 9 shows the
trend on imported capital goods to  GDP and  FDI to  GDP.  FDI increased from  around  1-2
percent of GDP in the mid-1980s to nearly 9 percent by 1992. During this period, Malaysia had
substantially liberalized its manufacturing sector and capital was absorbed without experiencing
declines in TFP growth levels.  Figure 10 shows a positive correlation between growth in the FDI
to  GDP  ratio  and  TFP growth  over the  period  1971-1997. It  confirms earlier  findings  that
countries that are more open to the rest of the world have greater ability to access and absorb
technological advances generated in  leading nations. These technological advances are  often
embodied  in  capital  goods  imports. Thus, it  is  not  surprising to  find a  positive  correlation
between growth in imported capital good to GDP and TFP growth as well.
TFP  Growth Equations:  Table 2  reports the  results  of the regression  equations. The
dependent variable is TFP growth rate, and the right hand side variables are: (a) growth in bank
lending to GDP, (b) growth in FDI to GDP, and (c) budget balance to  GDP. A better budget
balance is expected to be positively associated with TFP growth. A better fiscal balance could
signal that  the  Government  is  not  out  of  control  on  macroeconomic  policy,  and  thereby,
contribute to TFP growth (Fischer 1993). A budget surplus by crowding in the private sector,
may also help improve the TFP growth.  All variables were found to be stationary according to
the ADF test.
We also  include  dummy variables  which  allow us  to  distinguish  four  sub periods  of
Malaysia's recent economic history.  The first dummy represents the years 1974 and 1975 which
capture the impact of the first oil-shock. The second dummy represents the period before the first
oil shock and the period between 1976 and 1984.  A third dummy variable is included for the
financial crisis of the mid-1980s, covering the years 1985 and 1986.  The overall intercept thus
covers  the  10-year period  since  1987 when Malaysia's  economy  experienced robust  growth.
Since, these dummy variables cover different phases of growth they also allow us to control for
the level of capacity utilization in the economy.  This is important since capacity utilization can
affect TFP growth independent of the policy environment. During an upswing, increased demand
can lead to higher capacity utilization and measured TFP growth.
In column (1) in table 2, the coefficient on growth in bank lending to GDP is negative and
significant. A one percentage point increase in the growth of bank lending relative to GDP is
associated with a reduction in TFP growth by 0.16 percentage points, after controlling for the
effect of the other variables. The coefficient on FDI to GDP ratio is positive and significant. A
one  percentage  point  increase  in  the  growth  rate  of  FDI  to  GDP  is  associated  with  0.04
percentage point increase in TFP growth. The coefficient on budget balance to GDP has the right
sign and it is also significant. A one percentage point improvement in the level of budget balance
to GDP is associated with 0.30 percentage point increase in TFP growth.
We tried other policy measures on trade policy in the TFP growth equation. Column (3)
replaces FDI with imported capital goods. The coefficient on growth in imported capital goods to
GDP is positive and significant. A one percentage point increase in the growth rate in the ratio of
imported capital goods to  GDP is associated with  0.09 percentage point increase in the TFP
growth rate. It should be noted that the coefficient on imported capital goods is larger than the
9coefficient .on FDI, suggesting that technological change is taking place through channels which
are broader than FDI. Column (5) uses a traditional measure of openness-growth  in exports
plus  imports to  GDP.  This variable is significant and it has a  positive correlation with  TFP
growth. However, we can not say with certainty whether an increase in openness is causing the
TFP growth to pick up or it is the other way round. We did not find changes in average tariff rate
(measured by import  revenue to the Government as a  ratio of total  value of  imports) to  be
significant.
It could be argued that an increase in the growth of bank lending to GDP is endogenous and
thus the results reported here may not be robust. We tried to use an instrument to control for the
endogeneity of the bank  lending variable. Since bank lending is generally based  on physical
collateral and capital intensity of projects, we used a one year lagged growth in capital-output
ratio to  instrument  for the growth in bank lending to  GDP. Table  3 reports the instrumental
variable estimate of the TFP growth regression. The coefficient on bank lending to GDP remains
significant and negative. The coefficient on FDI, MKG, and budget balance have the right signs
and they are also significant.
Sensitivity tests: We carried out sensitivity tests on the TFP growth regression. First, we
added another financial policy variable used in the literature-financial  depth (M2/GDP). This
variable was not significant, and it did not change the sign or significance on the bank lending
variable. Second, volatility in inflation can make it difficult to pick good borrowers as it adds to
screening and monitoring  costs and thus  can affect TFP growth. Inflation,  however,  was not
significant.  Stability tests based on recursive residuals were performed on all models, and we
found coefficients to be stable over the period.
V.  WHERE DID THE BANK LENDING GO?
Commercial bank lending, which accounts for nearly 70% of the total bank lending, grew
at an average annual rate of nearly 19% in nominal terms over the period 1974-1997 (inflation
has not been a problem in Malaysia with CPI inflation rate averaging 3-4% during this period). If
we were to include the finance companies and merchant banks, the growth rate in lending would
increase to 20%.
Table 4 shows the sectoral allocation of commercial bank lending for three periods,  1974-
92, 1993-97, and the entire period. The first two periods correspond to the broad trends in TFP
growth. During the period 1993-97, and just prior to the regional crisis, the TFP growth rate was
on a downward trend (see Figure 2). The sectoral allocation of bank lending is shown for (a)
building,  construction  and  real  estate,  (b)  infrastructure consisting  of  electricity,  transport,
storage and communications, (c) purchase of stocks and securities, and (d) manufacturing. Bank
lending to building, construction and real estate increased from 21% during the period 1974-1992
to nearly  27% per  annum during the period 1993-97. There was an  even greater increase  in
lending to the infrastructure sector from 7% to  44% during the same period. Lending for the
purchase of securities increased from 15% to 37% during this period. In contrast, bank lending to
the manufacturing sector increased modestly from  19% to 21% during  the same period. The
10broad property sector, including housing,  and purchase of securities account for nearly 45% of
the outstanding stock of commercial bank lending. These are the sectors which are vulnerable to
changes in asset prices and have a high concentration of non-performing loans and therefore less
productive.
Did the regulatory  authorities try to  slow down credit growth?  The Central Bank did
introduce financial restraint in March 1997 in the form of ceilings on risky asset holdings, but
these measures may have come too  late. The Bank issued guidelines on lending to the broad
property sector and for the purchase of shares and unit trust funds. Under these guidelines, loans
to the broad property sector were subject to the limit of 20% of a banking institution's  total loan
outstanding, while loans for the purchase of stocks and shares were subject to a 15% of a banking
institution's  total loans outstanding. These guidelines were not very successful in slowing down
the credit growth. Exemptions were given to  several types of loans including construction of
residential houses, development of infrastructure projects, public utilities and amenities, and for
the  purchase  and  construction  of industrial  buildings. How  one  should  design  a  "negative"
directed lending is another policy issue? This would need to be examined in the broader context
of,  for  example,  the  design  and  role  of  deposit  insurance  scheme,  greater  disclosure  of
information,  and the  potential role  for  applying different  statutory reserve  requirements  on
individual banks depending on their risk profile and growth characteristics.
VII CONCLUSION
Malaysia  has  maintained an  exceptional growth record over  the  last  quarter century.
There is broad agreement that this was largely driven by the growth in physical capital stock.
Although the TFP levels have been respectable, its relative contribution to  growth has been
modest. Moreover, there are signs emerging that the TFP growth may have slowed down in the
late  1990s. Sustaining high  output growth rates  in  the future will require  placing  increased
emphasis on productivity improvements.
One  lesson  that  we  can  draw  from  the  Malaysian  experience  is  that  policies  that
encourage inflow of FDI and improve access to imported capital goods contribute to productivity
growth.  However,  there  are  other  policies  that  may  have  slowed  down  improvements  in
productivity growth. We find that rapid growth in bank lending relative to  GDP is  one such
factor. While Malaysia managed to mobilize savings (both domestic and foreign) and the rapid
growth in bank lending contributed to  capital accumulation, it did not help raise productivity
growth. Financial restraints, introduced in the form of negative directed lending,  speed limits,
and ceilings on lending to risky sectors, were not effective. More detailed industry level studies
are needed on how financial systems influence TFP growth.
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(62)  (13)  (25)  (70)  (13)  (18)
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Korea  5.8  3.4  0.7  1.6
(59)  (12)  (28)
Malaysia  4.54  6.86  0.58  2.0  3.7  2.3  0.5  0.9
(47)  (9)  (44)  (62)  (14)  (24)
Philippines  0.19  1.8  0.62  -0.78  0.5  1.1  0.5  -1.1
,.,-.  ...  __..,_..  ....  _._  .......... .,__..  ._._...  ,__.  _,...............  _.  _  .___-  -.  ., .........  ..  ,,  . ..  _.  .......  .
Singapore  5.09  6.45  1.06  2.23  5.1  2.7  0.4  2.0
(42)  14)  (44)  (53)  (8)  (39)
Thailand  5.24  7.32  1.51  2.03  5.2  2.3  0.6  2.1
(41)  (21)  (39)  (44)  (12)  (40)
Figures  in parentheses  are the contributions  to output  growth.
Effective  labor per person  corrects  for age related  productivity  differences  of the workforce  but not for education.





Included observations: 27 after adjusting
endpoints
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic
C  0.021  4.394  0.014  2.535  0.012  1.955
DI (1974-75)  -0.055  -4.486  -0.055  -4.482  -0.057  -4.245
D2 (1971-73, 76-84)  0.027  2.974  0.027  2.963  0.018  1.806
D3 (1985-86)  -0.013  -0.940  -0.008  -0.537  -0.026  -1.774
LOANG  -0.161  -4.071  -0.146  -3.614  -0.112  -2.381
FDIG  0.039  4.531
MKG  0.089  4.438
OPENG  0.166  3.650
LOGBB  0.295  3.719  0.270  3.388  0.174  1.958
R-squared  0.851  0.847  0.818
Adjusted R-squared  0.806  0.802  0.764
S.E. of regression  0.014  0.014  0.016
Sum squared resid  0.004  0.004  0.005
Log likelihood  80.380  80.101  77.740
Durbin-Watson stat  2.082  1.932  1.856
Mean dependent var  0.000  0.000  0.000
S.D. dependent var  0.032  0.032  0.032
Akaike info criterion  -5.436  -5.415  -5.240
Schwarz criterion  -5.100  -5.079  -4.904
F-statistic  18.975  18.518  15.012
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000  0.000  0.000
TFPG:  Total Factor Productivity Growth
LOANG:  Growth in (loans/GDP) ratio.
FDIG:  Growth in (FDI/GDP) ratio
MKG:  Growth in (Imported capital goods/GDP) ratio
BB:  Budget balance/GDP
OPENG:  Growth in (exports+imports)/GDP





Variable  Coefficient  t-Statistic  Coefficient  t-Statistic
C  0.032  3.531  0.027  2.491
DI (1974-75)  -0.045  -2.283  -0.045  -2.175
D2 (1971-73, 76-84)  0.041  2.604  0.041  2.501
D3 (1985-86)  0.016  0.625  0.020  0.750
LOANG*  -0.381  -3.303  -0.380  -2.984
FDIG  0.035  2.519
MKG  0.069  2.037
LOGBB  0.340  2.646  0.316  2.390
R-squared  0.618  0.591
Adjusted R-squared  0.503  0.468
S.E. of regression  0.023  0.024
F-statistic  8.160  7.572
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000  0.000
Mean dependent var  0.000  0.000
S.D. dependent var  0.032  0.032
Sum squared resid  0.010  0.011
Durbin-Watson stat  2.336  2.110
* Lagged capital-output ratio is used as an instrument.
TFPG:  Total Factor Productivity Growth
LOANG:  Growth in (loans/GDP) ratio.
FDIG:  Growth in (FDI/GDP) ratio
MKG:  Growth in (Imported capital goods/GDP) ratio
BB:  Budget balance/GDP
16Table 4: Growth of Commercial Bank Lending by Sector, 1974-97
Building,  Infrastructure  Share Purchase  Manufacturing
Construction,
and Real Estate
1974-92  21.1  10.0*  15.0  19.3
1993-97  26.8  43.8  37.0  21.3
1974-97  21.3  18.7*  19.1
*  1980-92 and 1980-97.
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Figure 4:  Contribution of Capital per worker, Human Capital per worker, and TFPG to growth
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19Figure 5:  Contributions of Labor Reallocation and Sectoral Labor Productivity Increase to
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Figure 9:  Trends in FDI/GDP and Imported Capital Goods/GDP
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